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This ethnographic article explores the 
politics of Egypt’s Ultras football sup-
porters. The Ultras have frequently been 
heralded as some of the Egyptian Revo-
lution’s most prominent rebels, in partic-
ular, after the Port Said stadium massacre 
in February 2012, when 72 Ultras mem-
bers were killed. However, this essay 
focuses on an earlier phase of violent 
clashes in central Cairo when the Ultras 
were highly ambivalent about the ongo-
ing protests. As the article shows, the fan 
groups were hesitant to join the demon-
strations, which at the time were heavily 
associated with “thuggery” (balṭaga). 
Only after the death of one of its mem-
bers did the Ultras whole-heartedly take 
on their rebellious subjectivity.
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Introduction
The Egyptian Ultras are well-organized 
groups of young football supporters, first 
established in 2007. These fans played an 
important role in protests and street fights 
at the time of the 25th January 2011 Revo-
lution. Almost exactly one year later, on 1 
February 2012, 72 members of Egypt’s 
largest Ultras group, Ultras Ahlawy, were 
killed after a match at a stadium in Port 
Said. Particularly after this massacre, the 
Ultras gained a reputation as some of the 
revolutionary struggle’s most archetypical 
rebels. The young football fans seemed to 
embody a combination of ordered mascu-
linity and untamed bravery that the post-
revolutionary nation required. In addition, 
their history of fighting the security state 
well before 2011 stood out as an epitome 
of the rebellious Egyptian youth’s quest 
for political rights and freedom.
This ethnographic essay homes in on the 
development of the Ultras fans’ status and 
repute during the month of protests and 
violent clashes that raged in Downtown 
Cairo in November and December 2011. 
This was a period when classed and gen-
dered debates about “thuggery” (balṭaga)1 
dominated public debates in ways that 
severely discredited those who were pro-
testing. Through a close examination of 
the ways in which the leadership of Cairo’s 
Ultras groups reacted and acted during 
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this short but eventful period, this essay 
illustrates how and why the death of one 
Ultras member became a turning point for 
the fan groups’ aspirations and politics. In 
conclusion, it attempts a more general 
suggestion regarding the interlocking 
politics of martyrdom, class and notions of 
respectability.
The ethnography presented in the essay 
weaves together a variety of different 
types of data: media sources, secondary 
literature, interviews and participant 
observation. It is part of a larger anthropo-
logical research project on Egyptian foot-
ball, for which I conducted 20 months of 
fieldwork in Cairo between 2011 and 2013. 
While the name of one of my interlocutors 
that appears in the text has been changed 
to ensure anonymity, I have chosen to 
keep the real names of journalists and 
individuals who are mentioned in the 
media sources that I use.
The Egyptian Ultras Movement, 2007-2011
The Egyptian Ultras movement began to 
take form in 2007. The two largest and 
most influential groups were from the out-
set Ultras Ahlawy (UA) and Ultras White 
Knights (UWK), supporting the two domi-
nant Cairo clubs, al-Ahly and al-Zamalek, 
respectively.2 Inspired by similar fan 
groups in Europe and elsewhere in North 
Africa, the Ultras represented a new type 
of fandom that appealed to broad layers 
of Egyptian youth. The supporter groups 
hence grew rapidly; already in 2009, UA 
and UWK occasionally managed to mobi-
lize more than ten thousand young men 
and teenagers in their respective curvas—
the curved sections behind the two goals—
at Cairo Stadium. Staging spectacular 
shows, involving songs, dance, powerful 
fire crackers (shamarīkh) and grand, cho-
reographed “entrance scenes” (dakhlāt, 
sing. dakhla),3 the Ultras dominated Egyp-
tian fan culture numerically, visually and 
audibly in the last years before 2011 (Sherif 
Hassan, Personal conversation).
The popularity of the Egyptian Ultras is 
typically related to their dedication and 
strict, non-negotiable principles: cheer for 
90 minutes no matter the result on the 
pitch; stand up throughout the entire 
match; travel to all games, home as well as 
away (Bashir 78-81). By observing these 
rules, the Ultras came to self-identify as 
distinct from more conventional support-
ers. For instance, the Ultras made a point 
of supporting their teams irrespective of 
wins and losses, and their club loyalties 
were understood to transcend the wor-
ship of individual players. Furthermore, 
the Ultras’ insistence on always watching 
matches live at the stadium set them apart 
from the great majority of Egyptians who 
for various reasons opted to watch the 
games on television. This oppositional 
ethos often found expression in catch-
phrases such as “against the media” and 
“against modern football,” sententiously 
summarizing the groups’ loathing for the 
commodified, globalized and mediatized 
spectacle into which football has turned in 
recent decades (170-84; Kuhn).
The Egyptian Ultras’ rebellious principles 
and attitudes were not only a key reason 
behind their appeal among the Egyptian 
youth. The same oppositional attitude also 
provided them with many enemies, both 
within the security state and in the football 
media establishment. Already in 2008, the 
police started to monitor and regulate the 
groups’ activities, equipments and mes-
sages in the curvas, and as the Ultras 
refused to compromise, violent confronta-
tions ensued between the fans and the 
security forces on several occasions (Sherif 
Hassan, Personal conversation). Criticism 
of the new supporters was also a regular 
and increasing feature in the sports press, 
where the Ultras were accused of violence, 
fanaticism, drug addiction, hatred and 
insults (Thabet 39-40). The reasons behind 
the groups’ rapid growth were also ques-
tioned, as prominent journalists insinu-
ated that the Ultras must be supported by 
some “political organization hiding behind 
the curtains” (45-46). In sum, Egypt’s Ultras 
supporters were regularly portrayed as a 
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serious problem to be dealt with by a 
broad coalition of older individuals and 
established institutions in the last years 
prior to January 2011.
This more or less unified criticism of the 
Ultras fans’ intentions, activities and poli-
tics drastically fragmented after the out-
break of the Egyptian Revolution. Con-
trarily, the Ultras were now increasingly 
portrayed as a vanguard of the revolution-
ary struggle. It is important to note the 
reluctance with which the supporter 
groups became enmeshed in the acceler-
ating national-political developments. 
True to their explicitly non-political profile 
and principles, none of Cairo’s Ultras 
groups actively encouraged their mem-
bers to join the protests on Tahrir Square. 
However, many joined in “as individuals,” 
and as a result, the football supporters’ 
characteristic songs, flags and fireworks 
were very much present throughout the 
eighteen days of protests (Hassan). 
Because of their experience of efficient 
on-the-ground organization and street 
fights, the groups played an important 
role as protectors of the sit-in on the 
square, in particular on 28 January, the so-
called Day of Rage (Dorsey; Zirin). Indeed, 
the Ultras movement’s long-time aversion 
to, and struggle against, the police—sum-
marized in the famous abbreviation 
A.C.A.B. “All Cops Are Bastards”—became 
part of a dominant narrative of the revolu-
tion as an anti-authoritarian quest for 
“freedom,” run by the “revolutionary 
youth” (shabāb al-thawra). In the years 
that followed, many journalists, activists 
and academics would note how the fan 
groups’ particular history had “prepared” 
them for street fights and fostered a disci-
pline and organization well suited for the 
revolutionary moment (Elgohari; Hamzeh 
and Sykes; Mosbah).
The Balṭagiyya on Muhammad Mahmoud 
Street
By the end of summer 2011, this narrative 
of the Ultras’ importance in the 25th Janu-
ary Revolution was well established 
among journalists and activists inside 
Egypt and abroad (Bilal; Elkayal; Lindsey). 
However, as winter was approaching, the 
status of any “revolutionary”—the Ultras 
very much included—was increasingly fac-
ing problematic questions. One term that 
perhaps more than any other encapsu-
lated the mood in Cairo this first revolu-
tionary autumn was balṭaga (approx. 
“thuggery”), and its derivative balṭagiyya 
(“thugs”, sing. balṭagī). This highly conten-
tious problem was discussed most 
intensely during the bloody protests and 
street fights that took place on and around 
Muhammad Mahmoud Street, Tahrir 
Square and (slightly later) outside the 
Cabinet building in November and 
December 2011. During this month of 
bloody unrest, I noted how distinctions 
were frequently drawn between good 
“revolutionary youth” (shabāb al-thawra) 
and those “thugs” (balṭagiyya), who pre-
sumably attempted to destabilize the 
nation and derail what had so far been 
achieved. Friends of mine, who previously 
had been largely positive towards Tahrir 
Square, popular power and demonstra-
tions, began to ask troubling questions 
about the usefulness of the protests and 
about the protesters’ origins and identi-
ties: who were these people who kept on 
defying the Ministry of Interior’s tear gas 
and bullets? Where did they come from, 
and what did they really want? Were they 
really revolutionaries, fighting in the 
nation’s interests? Or were they simply 
balṭagiyya, who had come to destroy and 
break down? 
To understand how and why the problem 
of balṭaga affected the Egypt Ultras move-
ment at this historical moment, a contex-
tualization of the concept’s origins, uses 
and abuses is necessary. As the Egyptian 
novelist Youssef Ziedan details in an arti-
cle published in al-Miṣrī al-Yawm on 30 
November 2011, the balṭagiyya’s identity, 
aims and actions have always been sur-
rounded by ambivalence. Ziedan notes 
that the term originally derives from the 
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Turkish word balṭa: a particularly heavy 
weapon, which it was the task of the 
balṭagī to carry in times of war or at public 
executions in the Ottoman era (see also 
Ghannam 122). However, as the modern 
Egyptian state took shape in the nine-
teenth century, the balṭagī was gradually 
disassociated from the state apparatus. 
Instead, his societal role came to oscillate 
diffusely between extortion and protec-
tion, predominantly in Cairo’s popular 
(shaʿbi) neighborhoods. In constant ten-
sion and dialogue with the similar but 
more favorably connoted male figure al-
futuwwa, the history of al-balṭagī is hence 
a steadily shifting one (Jacob 225-62). 
However, the balṭagī has consistently 
embodied a somewhat problematic, 
semi-legal and masculinized subjectivity, 
associated with physical strength, vio-
lence and money.
The balṭagī’s precarious position at the 
fringes of legality went through a series of 
particularly quick perturbations in the last 
decades of the Mubarak era. Indeed, 
Salwa Ismail has argued that thuggery 
effectively replaced Islamist terrorism as 
the main threat to the nation in Egyptian 
public imaginations in the late 1990s.4 In 
her ethnography, Ismail details how the 
focus on poor, young males as threatening 
balṭagiyya led to heavily increasing secu-
ritization and middle-class moral panics. 
For particularly “suspicious” characters—
such as street vendors, minibus drivers or 
just any working-class man in Cairo’s infor-
mal neighborhood (al-ashwāʾiyya)—this 
implied vastly increasing police violence 
and surveillance (Political Life 139-45). 
Many times, the problematic masculinity 
of the balṭagiyya was also associated with 
the serious and widespread problem of 
sexual mob violence against women in 
Egyptian public spaces (Amar, “Turning 
the Gendered”). 
As has been shown by Paul Amar (Security 
Archipelago), the Mubarak regime did not 
as much confront as cynically make use of 
the balṭagiyya. Facing increasing numbers 
of protests in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
the police gave up their half-hearted 
attempts at fighting the thugs and instead 
“appropriated them as a useful tool” (211). 
More precisely, Amar claims that the  
Ministry of Interior recruited these 
gangs to flood public spaces during 
times of protest [...] ordered [them] to 
mix with protestors and shout extremist 
slogans in order to make the activists 
look like ‘terrorists’, or, alternatively, to 
wreak havoc, beating civilians and do-
ing property damage in the area of the 
protest (211-2).
 
The result of this incorporation of the 
balṭagiyya into the security apparatus, 
Amar has termed the “balṭagī effect”: a 
manufactured depiction of oppositional 
demonstrations “as crazed mobs of brutal 
men [...] according to the conventions of 
nineteenth-century, colonial-orientalist 
figurations of the savage ‘Arab Street’” 
(212). Moreover, it is also well known that 
the police employed a network of former 
prisoners that many would consider as 
balṭagiyya to act as informers all across 
Egypt. In this way, the issue of the 
balṭagiyya at the same time crystallized as 
a discursive construction, a political tool 
applied by the regime, and as hordes of 
men of flesh and blood who roamed the 
Egyptian streets.
Before returning to how the Ultras football 
fans came to tackle this emerging prob-
lem, one final dimension of the distinction 
between balṭagiyya and revolutionaries 
should be made clear. As several com-
mentators have noted, the tendency to 
separate the country’s political actors 
between good and bad elements came 
with a bundle of problematic knock-on 
effects. During a round-table discussion at 
the conference Narrating the Arab Spring, 
held at Cairo University on 21 March 2012, 
political scientist and leftist activist Rabab 
El-Mahdi, for example, pointed to the 
strong class connotations of the balṭagiyya 
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discourse, which in her view created a 
counterproductive split between “respect-
able” middle-class “revolutionaries” and 
the “vulgar” lower classes. Another similar 
and very timely intervention was an article 
by historian Lucie Ryzova, published on Al 
Jazeera’s website on 29 November 2011. 
Ryzova here noted a distinct division 
between the lower-class men on the front-
line of the Muhammad Mahmoud clashes 
and the middle-class protesters, who were 
more likely to be located in the relative 
safety of Tahrir Square. Coming into cen-
tral Cairo from the informal neighbor-
hoods on “cheap Chinese motorcycles,” 
whilst sporting “a particular dress code 
and hairstyle that often involve copious 
quantities of gel,” the type of men that 
Ryzova saw fighting at the frontier had for 
many years been portrayed as trouble-
makers, sexual harassers and a threat to 
public order in the Egyptian mainstream. 
Hence, Ryzova argued, the notion of 
balṭagiyya would always come in handy 
for middle-class Egyptians when speaking 
about this particular lower-class masculine 
habitus. And yet, it was precisely these 
young men—often driven by a deep desire 
for revenge after years of police harass-
ment (see also Ismail, Political Life, “The 
Egyptian”)—who threw rocks at the police, 
carried the injured to hospital on their 
motorbikes, and paid with their blood as 
the security forces retaliated with birdshot 
and sharp ammunition. In a highly ambiv-
alent fashion, the group of men labeled as 
balṭagiyya were hence simultaneously the 
villains and the unsung heroes of the revo-
lutionary struggle.
Hesitation, Action
The focus on balṭagiyya in Egyptian pub-
lic discourse at the time of the Muham-
mad Mahmoud Street protests made leg-
ible an abject, problematically masculine 
Other. Simultaneously and dialectically, 
the trope also carved out a set of revolu-
tionary ideals that connoted non-violent 
respectability and middle-class normality. 
This discursive split clearly affected the 
stance of the Ultras groups towards what 
was happening. While Ultras I spoke to 
later confirmed that many members of 
both groups actively participated in the 
protests in November and December 
2011, neither Ultras Ahlawy nor Ultras 
White Knights ever directly called upon 
their members to join the fights via their 
official Facebook pages.5 For UWK, this 
attitude changed to some extent, when 
one of their members—a young man 
called Shihāb Aḥmed from the impover-
ished, informal (ashwāʾi) neighborhood 
Bulaq al-Dakrur—was killed on Muham-
mad Mahmoud Street on the third day of 
the fighting. Thereafter, the criticism of 
the police and the military became fiercer 
on UWK’s Facebook page, and all mem-
bers were instructed to attend the mar-
tyr’s funeral (22 Nov. 2011). 
However, not even at this point did UWK 
officially tell its member to join the strug-
gle en masse. Instead, representatives of 
UWK as well as Shihāb’s family had to face 
questions about the dead man’s history, 
morals and motives. In an interview pub-
lished in the online football magazine 
alforsan.net five days after Shihāb’s death, 
his mother struck back against those who 
questioned that her son was a proper rev-
olutionary martyr. Understandably shaken 
and pressured by the media questioning 
her son’s role in the street fights, she 
claimed that “the one who goes to a pro-
test prepared to sacrifice his life (mustaʿid 
li-l-tadḥiyya bi-ruḥī) cannot possibly be a 
balṭagī, but he is a hero and a man and not 
a tramp (mutasharrid) as some people 
claim.” The title of the article was indicative 
of the mood in the country and the protes-
tors being on the defence: “The mother of 
the martyr: those who die in Tahrir are not 
balṭagiyya” (Diyyāb).
The longer the unrest wore on, the more 
difficult it became to rid the protestors of 
accusations of balṭaga. After a short period 
of calm during the parliamentary elections 
in early December, the fighting broke out 
again on 16 December after a sit-in out-
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side the Cabinet building was broken up 
by military police. The scenes of tear-gas, 
Molotov cocktails, stone-throwing teenag-
ers and armed police firing rubber bullets, 
birdshot and live ammunition all seemed 
a ghastly re-run of an all-too-familiar script. 
Yet, a distinct change in attitude towards 
what was going on was at the same time 
noticeable. One taxi driver told me: “The 
police must hit them harder, to save the 
revolution.” At the grocer’s I was told: “The 
state must defend itself against those 
criminals. The people in this country need 
someone strong, someone like Mubarak.” 
My interlocutor Mahmoud, a gym teacher 
and Zamalek fan in his early 30s, was one 
of those who drastically re-conceptualized 
the political process around him. Only a 
few weeks earlier, Mahmoud had been 
firmly against the unacceptable violence 
committed by the military and the police. 
Three days into the second wave of vio-
lence—and just 24 hours after footage of 
Egyptian military police dragging and 
beating a veiled woman across Tahrir 
Square, famously revealing her bare belly 
and blue bra, had spread across the 
world—he instead told me: 
Have you seen those who camp in Tah-
rir Square now? I pass them every day 
on my way to work, and I can tell you, 
they are not good people, not respec-
table (mish muḥtarama). Probably they 
are paid by [the ousted President’s 
son] Gamal Mubarak to destroy the 
elections. By the way, that woman [in 
the blue bra], she was not a real mu-
naqqaba [woman wearing niqab, full-
body veil]. You could see that on the 
type of underwear she wore. This is 
a Muslim country, Carl. It cannot be 
run this way. But Inshaʾ Allah, it will 
be re-built step by step through elec-
tions and institutions. All of them are 
balṭagiyya! Honestly, it does not mat-
ter to me if they die or not. (Mahmoud, 
Personal conversation)
In the midst the growing public concern 
about the disreputable and randomly vio-
lent balṭagiyya that roamed the vicinities 
of Tahrir Square, public statements in sup-
port for those protesting were rare. The 
Ultras were very much in line with this gen-
eral pattern; a couple of days into the sec-
ond wave of clashes, leaders of both UA 
(18 Dec. 2011) and UWK (19 Dec. 2011) 
made statements on their Facebook 
pages, stressing their non-political stance 
and disassociating themselves from what 
was going on. Moreover, the UA capo 
Ahmed Idris came out in the press to vig-
orously deny the rumors that one of the 
men who had been killed in the clashes 
had been a member of his group. Instead, 
he made clear that UA were against “any 
action that hurts the interest of the country 
and its institutions (maslaḥat al-balad wa 
munshaʾatiha),” and that all individuals 
present at the protests were there as “citi-
zens” only and not as members of any kind 
of group (al-Shurūq, 21 Dec. 2011). In a 
politico-discursive climate where the pro-
tests connoted balṭaga—a concept which 
in turn was singled out as the main threat 
to the nation—Idris and UA sided with the 
“respectable” common good against the 
troublemakers.
When the fighting finally subsided, the 
Ministry of Health reported that 12 people 
had died and 815 had been injured. What 
is crucial for our story is that one of those 
casualties, a young student called 
Mohamed Mustafa, who often went under 
his nickname Karika, was a well-known 
member of Ultras Ahlawy. When Karika 
was shot dead on Qasr al-Ainy Street on 
21 December, Ultras Ahlawy were abruptly 
pushed straight back into the political 
struggle. Suddenly, their leaders’ recent 
statements, ensuring the group’s impar-
tiality, seemed alien and out of touch. On 
the 23rd of the month, al-Ahly played 
Maqaṣṣa at Cairo Stadium, and the entire 
match was turned into a tribute to the mar-
tyr and a manifestation against the state 
violence that had killed him. Most Ultras 
fans present were dressed in black instead 
of the normal red, the dakhla (“entrance 
scene”) before kick-off covered the curva 
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with a huge black and white portrait of 
their dead friend, and al-Ahly’s Portuguese 
coach Manuel Jose showed his sympa-
thies by wearing a T-shirt under his grey 
tweed jacket, on which was printed “RIP 
Mohamed Mustafa.” Throughout the 
game, the fans’ chanting against the ruling 
military council and the Ministry of Interior 
was also more explicit than before; high 
up above the curva, an enormous banner 
was hung with a message that read: “The 
engineer Mohamed, martyr of freedom. 
The balṭagiyya killed him with live ammu-
nition (Al-muhandis muḥammad shahīd 
al-ḥurriyya. Qataluh bi-l-rusās al-balṭagiyya) 
(Ultras Ahlawy’s Facebook, 23 Dec. 2011).
The contrast between the dead engineer—
Mohamed Mustafa had been an engineer-
ing student—and the balṭagiyya who killed 
him—referring not so vaguely to the Minis-
try of Interior and the military—had an 
important function. In the days that fol-
lowed, Mustafa’s educational qualifica-
tions and the fact that he had been one of 
the country’s best tennis players were con-
stantly reiterated in the media (e.g. Maher). 
This framing of the dead supporter effec-
tively disrupted the narrative of the ongo-
ing protests as a matter of lawless balṭaga, 
because as most Egyptians would instantly 
recognize, an engineering student who in 
addition played an expensive sport like 
tennis was not just anybody, but a mem-
ber of the country’s respectable upper 
middle classes. If anything, the killing of 
Karika seemed to prove that the demon-
strators were real, honorable shabāb al-
thawra (“revolutionary youth”) after all. At 
least, this was what Ultras Ahlawy insis-
tently claimed, when they honored Karika 
at Cairo Stadium. It made perfect sense for 
them to reflect the discourse of the estab-
lishment back onto the police and the mil-
itary. Singing from the stands their most 
provocative song about Egypt’s police-
men as failures in school and corrupt 
“crows” that destroyed the fun for the 
youth, the fans returned over and over 
again to a rhyming chant that was both 
simple and effective: “al-dakhiliyya—
balṭagiyya (“The Ministry of Interior—are 
balṭagiyya”)” (Ultras Ahlawy 07 Media).
Class, Martyrdom, and the Production of 
Rebels
In the beginning of 2012, Ultras Ahlawy 
cranked up the pressure against the 
interim regime yet another notch. In the 
stadium and outside, the group contin-
ued its blatant accusations of the ruling 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces for 
Karika’s death; they mocked the police 
more explicitly than ever before; and they 
turned more directly political in both 
words and deeds.6 Tragically, this period 
of mobilization would soon come to a 
very bloody end. On 1 February 2012, 72 
Ultras Ahlawy members were killed at the 
stadium in Port Said in a massacre that the 
Ultras themselves interpret as the security 
state’s revenge for the supporters’ oppo-
sitional activities. As I elaborate on else-
where (“Revolution, Play and Feeling”), 
the tragedy in Port Said further politicized 
the Egyptian Ultras movement. In the 
months that followed, Ultras Ahlawy espe-
cially came out in a spectacular campaign 
for justice and revolutionary reforms that, 
at least for a while, turned them into some 
of the revolutionary struggles most her-
alded rebels. While the Ultras had been 
widely celebrated for their political par-
ticipation already in 2011, the tragedy in 
Port Said further added to their revolu-
tionary credentials. For many, the death of 
the 72 young men seemed to have con-
firmed once and for all that the Ultras’ 
cause had been a just one, and it certainly 
made much broader segments of the 
Egyptian public aware of their history of 
struggle against the state and the police.7 
As this essay has shown, the Ultras’ uncon-
tested position as revolutionary rebels in 
2012 and 2013 was, however, preluded by 
a period in which the supporters’ stances 
vis-à-vis politics, the state and the revolu-
tionary struggle were characterized by 
hesitancy and ambivalence. In retrospect, 
the death of Mohamed Mustafa aka Karika 
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comes across as a crucial turning point 
within this decisive phase of late 2011: a 
particularly ‘generative event’ (Kapferer) 
through which the Ultras groups managed 
to dispose of their hesitation and unequiv-
ocally assume their rebellious ethos. It is 
particularly intriguing to compare the ease 
and confidence with which UA acknowl-
edged and publically honored Karika as 
the group’s revolutionary martyr, and how 
this narrative came into circulation in the 
Egyptian press, with the much less exten-
sive and more ambiguous coverage of 
Shihāb Aḥmed’s death a couple of weeks 
earlier. Clearly, Shihāb’s humbler origin as 
a son of Bulaq al-Dakrur (an informal 
neighborhood stereotypically associated 
with balṭaga) bestowed on his martyrdom 
a very different positionality within the dis-
cursive field of respectability, class and 
thuggery that dominated Egypt at the 
time. The contrast is all the more striking 
in light of the changing general opinion 
vis-à-vis the protests. In fact, and as I have 
shown, at the time when Shihāb was killed 
on Muhammad Mahmoud Street, the atti-
tude toward the protests was more posi-
tive than a month later when Karika died a 
few hundred meters further south on Qasr 
al-Ainy Street.
In order to understand the powerful emo-
tional and political “work” (Gribbon) and 
“productivity” (Armbrust) of Mohamed 
Mustafa’s martyrdom—in contrast to that of 
Shihāb Aḥmed’s—the former’s respectable 
middle-class status must hence be taken 
into account. In a period ridden by “hyper-
visibilization” (Amar, Security Archipelago) 
of low-class balṭagiyya as the urgent chal-
lenge of the nation, it would have been 
difficult for Egypt’s Ultras groups to par-
take in the struggle on Muhammad Mah-
moud Street without tarnishing their newly 
gained popularity. Mustafa’s death pro-
vided UA (and to a lesser degree UWK) 
with a way out of the deadlock. Not only 
did it push the tentatively non-political 
Ultras Ahlawy back into the fight against 
the police and the military, but through 
grand stadium spectacles, graffiti portray-
ing Karika’s face on the walls of Cairo and 
extensive coverage in the traditional press 
and on social media, his life was also “mat-
tering” to the idea and memory of the 
struggle itself (Paul). After the death of a 
middle-class member, Ultras activities 
could not as readily be dismissed as 
balṭaga. Indeed, in course of time, the 
entire month of violence—including the 
earlier clashes that the groups had 
refrained from joining as well as the death 
of Shihāb Aḥmed—would be folded into a 
more linear narrative of the Ultras group’s 
long revolutionary struggle against the 
Egyptian security forces (e.g. Mosbah). 
This particular historical moment, and its 
conflation of class, martyrdom and 
respectability, is thus crucial to bear in 
mind if we are to fully understand how and 
why the Egyptian Ultras steered clear of 
the looming accusations of balṭaga and 
surfaced as one of the Egyptian Revolu-
tion’s most celebrated groups of rebels.
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4 An indicative event that 
Ismail identifies as the 
beginning of a new era is 
the passing of the “‘thuggery 
law” (qānūn al-balṭaga) in 
1998 (Political Life 121-22). 
Perhaps, it could be argued 
that the period when the 
balṭagiyya were assumed to 
have been the main threat 
to the nation ended in 
summer 2013. Since the 3rd 
of July coup, and President 
al-Sisi’s war on terror, Islamist 
terrorism once again seems 
to have taken the place as the 
most acute issue to be dealt 
with.






(UWK) were at the time the 
standard medium through 
which the leadership of the 
Ultras groups communicated 
with their members.
Notes
1 Since most of the discourses 
that I explore in this essay 
occurred in spoken Egyptian 
Arabic, I have chosen to 
use the Egyptian colloquial 
transliteration balṭaga instead 
of the Standard Arabic 
variant balṭaja throughout 
this essay.
2 Famous examples 
elsewhere in the country are 
Yellow Dragons (supporting 
al-Ismaili from Ismailiya), 
Green Eagles (al-Masry from 
Port Said) and Green Magic 
(al-Ittihad, Alexandria).
3 Most European Ultras 
groups use the Italian word 
tifo when they talk about 
these entrance scenes.
6 See e.g. the photo album 
from the match al-Ahly vs. 
Al-Shurta 18 January 2012 on 
Ultras Ahlawy’s Facebook.
7 Hamzeh and Sykes have 
described this process as a 
transformation of the Ultras’ 
masculinity. After the 2011 
Revolution and the Port Said 
tragedy in early 2012, layers 
of “anti-militarist” masculinity 
and “martyrdom” masculinity 
were added to the “anti-
corporate” masculinity that 
the fans had embodied 
already prior to 2011. 
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